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Abstract This contribution aims to couple national institutional complementarities
to issues of regional development and long-term sustainability in Southeast Asia’s
non-core regions. A comparison is made of Satun in Southern Thailand and Perlis in
Northern Malaysia. Based on fieldwork data, the findings reveal that Malaysian
institutional complementarities result from a key role of the state, leading to
potentially ineffective forms of economic activity. On the Thai side, institutional
complementarities give free reign to entrepreneurs, but they are less conducive for
inclusive regional development and addressing environmental concerns. Based on
the case studies, findings of a more general applicability highlight two additional
issues. First, balanced regional development requires a set of institutional
complementarities that integrates economic growth with distributional strategies.
Second, more attention should be paid to the adaptability of institutional arrange-
ments as they may actually “lock in” regions in an unsustainable development
trajectory in the long run, be it in economic, social or ecological terms.
Keywords Institutional complementarities . Regional development . Thailand .
Malaysia
Institutional frameworks have been recognised as an important factor in the
explanation of geographical variations in economic performance, complementing
classical notions of comparative advantages (Lane & Myant, 2007; Peng & Delios,
2006; Whitley, 1999; Harriss, Hunter, & Lewis, 1995). The varieties of capitalism
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approach, as elaborated by Hall and Soskice (2001), has introduced the analytically
powerful concept of institutional complementarity: the simultaneous, interdependent
and enabling character of bundles of two or more institutional arrangements that in
themselves yield specific comparative advantages and thus steer entrepreneurship,
firm performance and economic development in a certain direction. Research in
Southeast Asian capitalist systems has also taken root in the last decade (for instance
Haggard, 2004; Doner, Ritchie, & Slater, 2005; Barlow, 1999). This article builds on
this line of work, with explicit attention to the sub-national level.
The aim of this contribution is twofold. First, we take the discussion of
institutional complementarities to the level of highly similar regions belonging to
different countries, in a comparative empirical investigation of the economies of two
peripheral regions: that of Satun, a province of Thailand, and the neighbouring
Malaysian state of Perlis. These areas have a similar physical geography, the
majority of their populations is composed of Muslims of Malay descent, and both
regions shared a common history until a century ago. In 1909, the international
border was drawn between Thailand and what is now Malaysia, separating Satun
from Perlis.1 Since then, both regions have experienced different economic
trajectories that can essentially be explained by their belonging to two markedly
different national contexts. How have these differences impacted on regional
economic development and firm performance characteristics, and to what extent can
these be related to institutional complementarities “on the ground,” (i.e., in the specific
contexts of Perlis and Satun)? Second, beyond the specific cases of Perlis and Satun
analysed here, we will discuss the more general implications of our findings for
regional development in non-core regions of Asia. What is the role of institutional
complementarities in economic performance? What perspectives do different models
of management and governance offer? We will specifically consider distributional
aspects as well as longer-term sustainability.
The next section introduces the institutional approach in Southeast Asia, taking
the varieties of capitalism (hereafter VoC) approach as a starting point, but proposing
some amendments. This is followed by a brief discussion of methodology issues in
which the Thai and Malaysian institutional complementarities are also introduced.
Then, the specific characteristics of the two regions’ institutional frameworks are
analysed by means of a comparison of two industries that characterise economic
activity in the two study regions: Satun’s seafood industry, and Perlis’s construction
and real estate industry. The discussion of findings will then aim at deriving
conclusions of a more general applicability.
National institutional complementarities in Southeast Asia
The VoC approach asserts that firms are the central organisations within each capitalist
system. Hall and Soskice (2001) argue that in order to develop and coordinate core
1 During the Second World War the Japanese briefly transferred control over Perlis to the Thai
government. Perlis became a Malaysian State in 1957 when Malaysia gained independence from the
British.
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competencies, firms must maintain relationships within five institutional spheres:
industrial relations, vocational training and education, corporate governance, inter-
firm relations and coordination vis-à-vis their own employees. Thus, each firm
operates in a complex environment with many institutional relationships, either
formal or informal.2 Furthermore, the five spheres, or particular sets of institutional
relationships, are closely interconnected. One type of relationship in one sphere
calls for a corresponding arrangement in other spheres in order to be effective.
Hall and Soskice (2001) have termed these sets institutional complementarities.
Such complementarities are responsible for comparative institutional advantages and
ultimately specific varieties of capitalism.
It is regrettable that the VoC approach tends to focus exclusively on the dichotomy
between liberal market economies (LMEs), such as the USA and Britain, on the one
hand, and coordinated market economies (CMEs), of which Japan and the “Rhineland”
European economies are the best-known examples, on the other (Allen, 2004).
Revealing the Western bias in much of the literature on economic systems, Tickell
and Peck (1995) stereotyped Malaysia and the Philippines as cases of “primitive
taylorism,” notable for “taylorist labour processes with almost endless supply of
labour, bloody exploitation, huge extraction of surplus value, coupled with the
presence of dictatorial states and high social tension.”3 Such statements do little justice
to the specifics and the diversity of Asian economic systems, suggesting (perhaps
unwittingly) that the non-Western world is an undifferentiated set of substandard and
generally deficient institutional arrangements, vaguely but inadequately reflecting the
models of the part of the world that counts.
Therefore, in addition to considering the institutional spheres of the VoC approach
we aim to address two crucial issues in this study. Although the VoC approach
considers economic power, it neglects political power, often viewed as highly
relevant in Southeast Asian capitalist systems (Haggard, 2004; Gomez, 2002;
Barlow, 1999). Leading economist Pranab Bardhan convincingly argues for the
inclusion of political power in institutional economic analyses. In his view, power
relations matter especially for understanding the distributive effects of institutions.
Disabling institutions often survive because they serve the interests of those
powerful enough to change them (Bardhan, 2005: 27–86). Land rights are a classic
example of institutional inertia due to power configurations. According to Carney
(2004), commenting on the difficulties of industrial restructuring after the Asian
financial crisis, “economic power has concentrated in the hands of a small number of
politically connected incumbents who are in a position to perpetuate their elite
positions and frustrate the entry of new agents into the economy.” Elsewhere,
Schmidt (2003) has incorporated political power in her elaboration of the VoC
approach. She identified at least three varieties of capitalism: market capitalism
2 Here we follow North (1991): “Institutions are the rules of the game in society or, more formally, the
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. Institutions are generally divided into formal
and informal institutions. Formal institutions are economic, political (and judicial) rules and contracts;
informal institutions are informal codes of conduct, norms of behaviour and conventions.” Thus North
clearly separates institutions from organisations.
3 See Bain et al. (2002) for a contemporary study of taylorism.
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(similar to LMEs), managed capitalism (similar to CMEs) and state capitalism in
which firms and governmental authorities are the key organisations. Schmidt
introduced state capitalism to conceptualise French institutional complementarities
between the 1950s and 1970s. In the Southeast Asian context, Jayasuriya (2004,
2003) stated that domestic coalitions between economic and political actors and
politically motivated side payments to less-favoured parts of the society comprise
essential components of each national institutional framework. In sum, empirical
institutional research in Southeast Asia certainly requires the inclusion of the
political dimension, especially if one also wishes to derive policy implications.
Moreover, power is important in analysing the position of peripheral regions within
national (and global) space economies, as in our case.
Besides the neglect of political power, a further aspect unaccounted for in the VoC
approach is the often personal approach to conducting business that prevails in many
developing countries. Carney and Gedajlovic (2001) have thus distinguished personal
capitalism, in which ownership and control of firms are combined, while business
links and firm configurations are often patterned on kinship relations. Many of
Southeast Asia’s major companies are conglomerates whose growth trajectories are
based on personal capitalist characteristics. And many of these conglomerates were
founded by ethnic Chinese (Gomez & Hsiao, 2003; Mackie, 1999; Suehiro, 1989).
From the preceding discussion it is evident that capitalist systems can be analysed in
several ways. This article proposes to embrace Hall and Soskice’s concept of
institutional complementarities, but without their singular distinction of an LME-CME
dichotomy. Instead our theoretical approach combines Schmidt’s (2003) typology of
market, managed and state capitalism and Carney and Gedajlovic’s (2001) notion of
ownership and control and it takes into account the political dimension of institutional
arrangements (Bardhan, 2005; Jayasuriya, 2004, 2003).
Setting up the empirical cases
This contribution is concerned with the role of institutional complementarities in
shaping economic development in peripheral regions of Thailand and Malaysia. The
Thai-Malaysian border area (Figure 1) offers a promising setting for a comparative
study on the role of institutional frameworks as it allows us to some extent to control
for local factors. While we accept that no two regions in the world are identical, their
physical geography, historical patterns and population characteristics are sufficiently
similar to assume that divergence between the two regions since their separation in
1909 is likely the result of differences in the national frameworks in which they have
been incorporated. Our hypothesis is, then, that this difference in national context
entails different institutional conditions, encouraging specific directions of economic
development in each region, while discouraging others. Most of these steering
institutional complementarities are likely to be defined at the national level, but of
course some may actually be locally embedded. In this respect Schamp (2003) has
argued that the debate on the spatial boundaries of economic institutions has just
begun and hence, it is highly plausible to include national institutions in analyses of
regional development.
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Although both Malaysia and Thailand belong to the middle-income category,
patterns of economic growth and institutional frameworks are by no means the same.
Table 1 shows that Malaysia is clearly the more advanced country: its GNI and HDI
per capita are substantially higher and have increased faster; agriculture is no longer
the major sector of employment and its economy appears more open; or at least, it has
a highly open export manufacturing sector. Reflecting these differences in national
contexts, the two study areas display different economic profiles. Whereas Satun
remains essentially rural, with more than half of its income and employment based on
Figure 1 Map of Satun and Perlis. Map produced by Geomedia, UU based on various sources
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agriculture and fisheries, Perlis boasts a rather diversified economy with services as
the lead sector along with some manufacturing, including foreign plants (Table 2).
Remarkably, construction emerges as a key component of the Perlis economy,
suggesting considerable dynamism. In contrast, Satun’s non-primary economic
activities are limited to a small services sector based in its capital Satun Town, as
well as some processing of primary products, notably a large tuna canning plant.
Table 3 compares the institutional and political aspects of the Thai and Malaysian
national economies, based on an extensive list of sources. Similar to the variety in
economic performance, many differences in national institutions can be observed. A
major difference is the role of the private and public sector. In Thai capitalism, firms
occupy a more strategic position, whereas governmental authorities are very active
in Malaysia. This is confirmed by the government expenditure indicator in Table 1.
Another striking difference is the relation between ethnicity and economic
institutions. Since 1971 the Malaysian government has actively sought to enhance
the economic position of the Malay (Bumiputera) majority relative to the ethnic
Chinese and ethnic Indian minorities, most notably through the so-called new
economic policy (NEP). Ethnic Chinese businesspeople also account for much of the
economy of Thailand, but this has not resulted in similar ethnic-based policies.
Overall, in Schmidt’s (2003) terminology Thailand has a managed variety of
capitalism, with some features of a market variety, whereas Malaysia is closer to a
state variety of capitalism. How these varieties impinge upon our empirical cases
will be analysed in the following.
To accommodate the theoretical considerations discussed in the previous section,
we adhered to the following set-up. With respect to private sector development we
analysed inter-firm relations, corporate governance (specifically access to finance),
and human capital formation; the last-mentioned as a proxy for Hall and Soskice’s
institutions pertaining to industrial relations. Given the expected role of personal
capitalism (especially significant in the case of Thailand) and robust state
intervention in Malaysia (Table 3), political power and personal capitalism are
included in the analysis, as already discussed.
Table 1 Socio-economic differences between Thailand and Malaysia.
Malaysia Thailand
1975 2004 1975 2004
Total population (millions) 12.3 24.9 41.3 63.7
HDI index 0.616 0.805 0.615 0.784
GDP per capita rank (ppp)–HDI Rank −4 −9
Labour force (%) 1990 2005 1990 2005
Agriculture 26 15 64 43
Industry 20 20 10 15
Services 54 65 26 42
Government expenditure (% of GDP) 13.8 13.1 9.4 11.8
2000 2004 2000 2004
GNI per capita (atlas method, US$) 3,390 4,520 2,010 2,490
Total trade (% of GDP) 199.5 195.7 107 129.4
Total external debt (% of GNI) 50.6 46.6 66 32.4
Sources: UNDP, 2006; ADB, 2006.
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The next two sections will elaborate on ownership and control, inter-firm
relations, access to finance, human capital formation and the political dimension of
institutions within two industries: the seafood industry in Satun and the construction/
real estate industry in Perlis. It may seem odd to select two fairly different industries
for a comparative analysis. Differences in organisation and characteristics of the two
industries do indeed impose limitations on comparison. The reason why they have
nevertheless been selected is that both industries clearly reveal the way national
institutional complementarities affect patterns of regional development. Thus,
seafood in Satun and construction in Perlis constitute the emblematic industries of
their respective regions, which reveal key features of the two models under scrutiny.
Data collection and subsequent analysis of the two regional economies were not
limited to these two industries. The data base covers overall economic activity in
Satun and Perlis. Data are drawn from two main sources. First, a firm survey
conducted between July 2004 and December 2004 was concerned with mapping
institutional relations, including ownership and control features, networking patterns
Table 3 Thailand’s managed variety and Malaysia’s state variety of capitalism.
Thailand Malaysia
Political economy Agriculture also successful in
international markets; government
is enabler, facilitator
Clear dual political economy:
globalized enclaves with domestic
protected markets; government is
interventionist, dirigiste
Domestic coalitions Sino-Thai entrepreneurs active
in both domestic and international
economy; entrepreneurs often active
in politics
Nurturing of Bumiputera business
elite, closely related to UMNO
joint ventures between ethnic-
Chinese and Malay firms
Side payments Relatively moderate Huge and many different kinds
Inter-firm relations Competitive plus...cooperative,
mutually reinforcing and networked based
State led state mediated
Access to finance Major role for banks Major role for state
Sources: Case, 2005; Gomez, 2002; Hewison, 2005; Jomo, 2003, Krongkaew, 1999; Mackie, 2003; Pasuk
and Baker, 2004; Schmidt, 2003; Wingfield, 2002.
Table 2 Basic indicators of Satun and Perlis.
Satun Perlis
1990 2004 1990 2004
Total population 227,000 270,000 188,000 218,000
Islam (%) 67 68 79 84
Labour force (%)
Agriculture 74 57 33 15
Industry 13 10 22 24
Private services 10 26 21 34
Public services 4 7 24 27
Per capita GRP in US$ 1,630 2,589
GRP in US$ (million) 439.8 564.4
Sources: Auditor General, (2006), Department of Statistics (1993/2005).
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of firms (supplies, customers, competitors, civil servants), the nature and frequency
of these relations (contracts, meetings, role of business associations) as well as
access to finance (role of banks, government loans, shareholders and other intra-firm
sources). A total of 44 firms were approached in Satun (of which 6 refused to
cooperate), and 48 in Perlis (of which 9 refused). The businesses included in the
study represent all large and a sample of medium-sized companies. In Satun, firms
from the latter group, defined as having a registered capital between Thai Baht 1
million and 15 million, were randomly sampled from a comprehensive digital list of
the Department of Commerce. Since there is no single reliable register of all firms in
Perlis, sampling there had to be carried out from a list derived from several sources.
In order to assure coverage of Bumiputera as well as ethnic Chinese firms, lists from
both the Malay and Chinese Chambers of Commerce were used. In addition, the
listings of Malaysia’s Company Commission (SSM) and the State Economic
Development Corporation were obtained to complement our sampling frame. In
Perlis medium-sized companies were defined as employing between 5 and 300
workers.4 Answers were then processed by the SPSS software package for simple
statistical analyses. Very small firms were excluded from the research.
Second, between February 2006 and June 2006 semi-structured and open
interviews were conducted with a variety of organisations and individuals:
representatives from associations, national and regional governments, bank
managers and journalists. In Satun, 29 key informants were interviewed, and 33 in
Perlis.5 In both Satun and Perlis firms were approached in person. In virtually all
surveys and interviews in Satun interpreters were used. In Perlis 50% of the surveys
and interviews were carried out without the aid of an interpreter, as managers and
owners of larger firms were generally able to communicate in English. Some 25% of
the data gathering took place with a Bumiputera interpreter and the remaining 25%
with an ethnic Chinese interpreter (mostly Hokkien). Interviews took around one
hour on average and predominantly served to cross-check findings from the survey,
and gauge backgrounds, motives and interests. The interviews also dealt with aspects
of human capital formation (training of workers and education policies) and the
political dimension of institutions (networks involving politicians and entrepreneurs,
commercial interests of politicians, the conduct of tender processes). Of course, the
use of interpreters may lead to slight distortions of the information gathered.
Interviewees were usually very cooperative, but several respondents in Perlis
showed some reluctance to disclose information that was deemed sensitive. The
interviews were analysed through identifying keywords, allocation answers to the
keywords and then comparing the answers. For a full outline of the research
methodology, see Andriesse (2008).
4 Due to differences in registration of firms, size classification methodology had to vary somewhat
between the two countries.
5 Some of these interviews were conducted outside the research areas: Hat Yai and Bangkok for the Satun
case and Alor Setar and Putrajaya for the Perlis case. In recent years, many governmental authorities have
transferred their offices from Kuala Lumpur to Putrajaya.
466 E. Andriesse, G. van Westen
Institutional arrangements in the Satun seafood industry
The seafood industry
Thailand is a well-known exporter of seafood, harvested from fisheries as well as
aquaculture. In 2004 Thailand ranked 3rd worldwide in terms of export value, and 5th in
terms of volume; an improvement from 8th and 11th positions respectively in 1984
(FAO, 2007). Perhaps even more remarkable was the emergence of a Thai
multinational, the Charoen Phokpand Group, as a leading actor in organising the
global value chain for shrimps (Goss, Burch, & Rickson, 2000; Pananond & Zeithaml,
1998). The largest concentration of fishery activities is still based in the Bangkok area.
However, unsustainable practices especially in shrimp aquaculture have prompted the
industry to gradually spread south along the Gulf of Thailand, and further on the
Andaman Coast, in the classical pattern of a moving resource frontier.
As the southernmost province flanked by the Andaman Sea, bordering Malaysia,
Satun was one of the last parts of Thailand to be included in this commercial fishery.
Although it is a small and remote province, with a population of approximately
270,000, it is not a particularly poor one. It ranked 20th out of 76 Thai provinces on
the UNDP Human Achievement Index in the 2007 issue (UNDP, 2007). Thailand’s
space economy shows a concentration of manufacturing and modern service
industries in the Bangkok area, while the provinces serve mostly as suppliers of
raw materials. Satun can be seen as a resource frontier in this constellation. Latex
extraction from rubber trees and ocean fishing are by far its most important
industries. The former is mainly carried out by smallholders and a single latex
processing firm (most of the processing takes place in neighbouring Songkhla
Province). The fisheries industry in Satun has seen the rise of a seafood cluster (a
group of spatially concentrated and closely linked firms), consisting of boat owners,
fishermen, fish processing establishments, transportation firms, ice factories and
support activities. Satun has two fishing ports: Tammalang, just south of Satun
Town, and Pak Bara near La-ngu. Satun’s two ports are responsible for 25% of all
fish handled along Thailand’s Andaman coast (Department of Fisheries, 2005). The
prominence of fisheries in Satun is reflected in the composition of its gross regional
product (GRP) and the labour force. The share of fisheries in Satun’s GRP excluding
processing and related activities was 20% in 2005, and approximately 20% of the
total labour force work in the fisheries cluster (NESDB, 2007; NSO, 2005).6
Interestingly, the fisheries industry on the Malaysian side of the border is
substantially smaller than in Satun, in spite of similar resource conditions.
Why has this seafood cluster emerged in Satun? It is clearly a private-sector-
driven industry that in its rise reflects Satun’s resource base as well as the role of
nearby Hat Yai as the economic centre for the south of Thailand. Seen from Hat Yai,
Satun is an attractive new location for the seafood industry, tapping into relatively
little used resources when fisheries on the Gulf of Thailand coast had already been
well established (e.g., Pattani). Businesspeople from Hat Yai and their relatives
6 The latter percentage is based on estimation: summing up the number of fishermen and the number of
employees working in firms of the seafood cluster.
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played a considerable part in the creation of the Satun seafood cluster. Moreover,
Satun’s Muslim Malay population is prepared to do the hard work required of
fishermen at sea, an occupation less popular among Thai populations further north.
Institutional arrangements
What institutional arrangements drive the Satun seafood cluster and do institutional
complementarities affect its performance? In terms of ownership and control, it is
striking that all surveyed firms within the cluster are owned by Sino-Thai
businesspeople—this in contrast to the Muslim majority in Satun’s population. In
several cases, one of the parents of the owner migrated from China, but most have
lived in Thailand for generations. Typically, firms in the seafood cluster are
independent, not subsidiaries of other firms. Some have the legal form of limited
partnerships (at least two shareholders), others are limited companies (a minimum of
seven shareholders). As a rule, all shareholders are relatives. A considerable number of
these shareholding kin live in Hat Yai, the regional business hub. Management tasks
are generally carried out by the owners themselves, as employees are not considered
important stakeholders. In this respect Satun fits the general Chinese family-based
business pattern of personal capitalism: i.e., the coupling of ownership and control
and an orientation towards shareholders and kin rather than (other) stakeholders. The
employees, mostly Muslim Malays and migrants from Myanmar, are recruited for their
willingness to work hard for low wages; personal ties do not play a significant role and
long-term commitments between employer and employee are not actively pursued.
The most prominent firm in the cluster and by far the largest firm in the province
is Siam Tin Foods. It was established in 1986 by a Bangkok entrepreneur, introduced
to Southern Thailand through his wife. He considered Satun a good location for
seafood processing because of its abundance of seafood, labour and cheap land.
Since then, the firm has grown to employ 1,300 workers, exporting canned fish to
Europe and the United States. The firm has 10 shareholders in addition to the
founder-cum-managing director who holds 25% of the stock. Similar to Siam Tin
Foods, other entrepreneurs have moved in to take advantage of Satun’s comparative
advantages. The second largest firm (100 employees) is a shrimp processing
company owned by the mayor of Satun Town. His most important client is the
Charoen Phokpand Group that orchestrates the extensive logistics necessary to get
Thai shrimps on dining tables all over the world.
The firm survey reveals highly informal, personal and networked inter-firm
relations. Firms at the start of the value chain have suppliers outside Satun
(chemicals for an ice factory, equipment for boat owners) and clients in Satun
(processing and distribution firms), whereas processing firms often have local
suppliers, but deliver to clients outside of the province (wholesalers and exporters).
Suppliers and clients within the cluster rarely sign formal contracts, but deal with
each other on an informal and personal basis. The owner of an ice factory
commented: “I like to give suppliers and clients a present for Chinese New Year and
thank them for their support.” The cooperation between this firm and a distributor is
illustrative of the informal nature of inter-firm relations: “When we want some
material from Bangkok ..., we ask them to transport material from suppliers [sic];
Our clients agree, because they normally drive their trucks back to Satun empty.”
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Cooperation among entrepreneurs is also facilitated through three local organisa-
tions: the Satun Chamber of Commerce, the Sino-Thai Chong Hua Association and
the local Rotary Club. Moreover, kinship relations frequently facilitate business
contacts. Hongyen Tammalang, for instance, a fish processing firm that also owns
boats, has as its most important client a relative in Chumphon Province. Overall,
inter-firm relations fit into the so-called guanxi style of doing business (Li, 2007).
Guanxi can be considered as a set of specific informal institutions, which enable
entrepreneurship and in which personal connections are often key drivers. In fact,
most entrepreneurs in Satun’s private sector are Sino-Thai who practise guanxi
(Andriesse, 2006). Although inter-firm relations in Thailand are also driven by
competition (Table 3), guanxi-style cooperation stands out in Satun, perhaps fostered
by the lack of interaction between the local business elite and the Muslim majority.
However central the family-based Sino-Thai private company may be to Satun’s
economy, it is complemented by relatively easy access to finance. According to
Carney and Gedajlovic (2001), personal capitalism “has negative implications
regarding a firm’s ability to raise financial capital.” This is the case in Malaysia, as
will be clarified in the next section, but in Thailand banking has greatly contributed
to private sector development (Mackie, 2003; Wingfield, 2002). Hewison (2001) and
Suehiro (1989: 110-172) have traced the rise of these Thai banks to successful Sino-
Thai families able to build large financial conglomerates (some as spin-offs from rice
milling) with the support of the Thai bureaucracy and military leaders in the 1950s.
Even in a peripheral province such as Satun many banks have opened a branch there.
On average 58% of their transactions are related to personal banking, and 42% to
corporate banking.7 Indeed, a majority of the seafood firms mentioned banks as the
main source of start-up capital. Financial risks are reduced by also relying on
shareholders (read relatives). Furthermore, finance is sourced via networking in the
associations as presented earlier.
On the one hand the complementarity of guanxi institutions and relatively easy
access to finance appears to benefit the growth of the seafood cluster, but on the
other hand employees are to some extent excluded from participation. Sino-Thai
entrepreneurs seem less committed to foster relations with workers by paying them
good wages (in fact workers from Myanmar often receive less than the minimum
wage of US $88 per month (BOI, 2007)), or by providing social security or training
to workers. As a consequence, employees lack incentives to invest in their jobs and
human capital formation is limited. Moreover, few banks offer financial products
conforming to Islamic laws, which may well constrain private business development
among Muslims. As for the public sector, the Department of Fisheries and the Fish
Marketing Organisation offer some support and regulation services (safety and
quality inspection, information supply, etc.), but are not directly involved in the
development of the cluster, nor do they provide credit for private sector
development. On the whole, the public sector is not much concerned with the
interests of Islamic workers and labour migrants from Myanmar. Thus the relative
neglect by the public sector contributes to the continuing economic exclusion of the
majority population in the province.
7 Based on interviews with bank managers.
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Finally, the political dimension of the institutional arrangements remains to be
discussed. Personal power networks in the seafood cluster evolve in two ways.
Firstly, leading entrepreneurs may be consulted for policy advice. The managing
director of Siam Tin Foods, for instance, acts as an economic adviser to the
Governor of the province. This enables him to obtain information and to coordinate
matters relevant for his businesses. Secondly, the guanxi style of doing business has
a political dimension as many leading Sino-Thai entrepreneurs are active in the
Satun Town Municipal Government. As already noted, the mayor owns a shrimp
farm, and a vice mayor and another member of the Satun Municipal Council (a
younger brother to the former mayor) own many fishing boats. Municipal politics is
another platform for the seafood entrepreneurs to coordinate business with each
other. Sino-Thai businesspeople are elected into municipal office as Muslims are not
a majority in Satun Town. Ethnic-based voting explains why they cannot become
national politicians. Members of Parliament representing Satun Province are always
Muslims, reflecting the population composition. Therefore, there are no effective
entrepreneur-politician networks linking the province’s business interests with
provincial and national politics, as is the case in many other Thai provinces (Askew,
2006; Nelson, 2005; Pasuk & Baker, 2004; McVey, 2000). The Satun Town Council
has emerged as a substitute locus of political representation for Sino-Thai
entrepreneurs, but it is unable to secure their interests. The Town Council does not
offer them access to decision making and budget allocations at the national level,
which is far more important than what can be done locally.
Institutional arrangements in the Perlis construction and real estate industry
The construction and real estate industry
The second empirical case is the construction and real estate industry in Perlis, the
Malaysian state bordering Satun. In contrast to Satun’s seafood cluster the
construction and real estate industry is a purely domestic activity, not involving
exports. However, it can actually be seen as the key driver in the regional (state)
economy. Construction and real estate have long been important in Malaysia’s
economy, particularly so in the beginning of the 1990s when then Prime Minister
Mahathir, flush with success in export manufacturing and with revenues from oil and
gas exports, initiated several “mega projects.” In the more sober period that followed,
some projects were scrapped. However, the Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006–2010) has
revived the construction industry as a key instrument of economic policy. This is
specifically notable in the small and relatively peripheral state of Perlis with a
population of 210,000 of whom 84% are Bumiputeras and 10% ethnic Chinese. It is
thus part of the Malay heartland of Malaysia: a state predominately populated by the
politically powerful but economically less favoured Bumiputera population. As such,
Perlis ranks among the less developed states. Nevertheless, Perlis is considerably
better off than its Thai neighbours, as reflected in its per capita GRP, 59% higher than
Satun’s, and in a range of other indicators such as per capita number of hospital beds,
teachers, private cars, and so on.
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In stark contrast to Satun and perhaps surprising for a relatively rural and
peripheral part of the country, the public sector is the main driver of the regional
economy. Public services in themselves are a backbone of the Perlis economy,
engaging 27% of the total labour force. The importance of the construction and real
estate industry is directly linked to the key role of the public sector. In 2004
construction alone contributed 5.9% to GRP and employed no less than 10% of the
total labour force—much more than corresponding figures for Satun at 2.2% and
4.4% respectively (unfortunately, data for real estate activities are not available). The
prominence of the construction/real estate industry in Perlis is based on several large
public projects, among which include schools, tourist facilities, highways and new
offices for the Perlis State Government. Recently, Perlis has embarked on a strategy
to become a “knowledge state.” Several new schools and colleges were welcomed to
the state, the Northern Malaysia University College of Engineering (KUKUM) being
the most important. As the Perlis Sate Government has few financial resources, the
Federal Government funds virtually all projects.8 Private construction initiatives are
relatively unimportant.
The role of construction and real estate is not immediately obvious from the
statistics quoted. The point is that in Perlis, the state (federal and local) actively
intervenes in economic life in efforts to create new regional competitive advantages
in order to promote the position of the economically disadvantaged but politically
powerful Malay population. This is in contrast to Satun, where private entrepreneurs
take the initiative to exploit the existing comparative advantages in natural resource-
based activities. Indeed, here we touch on the key feature of the regional economy,
namely that it is essentially based on Malaysia’s extensive system of side payments
to the economically less favoured Malay heartland. The level of income, welfare and
services enjoyed by the Perlis population has relatively little to do with its basic
industries and the market sector. In reality, the dynamism of the Perlis economy is
generated by transfers from the Federal Government, funds channelled into a
seemingly never-ending series of project ideas to promote this predominantly Malay
state. Whether it concerns a halal food hub, tourism facilities, industrial estates or
promoting a knowledge-based economy; each project translates into construction
activities for local firms that usually consist of a Malay front operation, often with
political-administrative connections, and ethnic Chinese junior partners and subcon-
tractors. Although many development projects are undoubtedly serious in intent,
many others can be challenged in terms of their economic viability. At times,
“having projects”—i.e., spending transfers on local construction—seems more
important than the eventual use of completed facilities. This raises the impression of
a regional economy focused more on federal transfers and the corresponding
opportunities for rent seeking—especially in construction and real estate—than on
local productive performance.
8 To put things in perspective: the total costs of the new KUKUM are around RM 800 million, the
highway between Kuala Perlis and Changloon RM 400 million, but the total annual revenues of the Perlis
State Government are less than RM 100 million.
Unsustainable varieties of capitalism along the Thailand–Malaysia border? 471
Institutional arrangements
In contrast to Satun, in Perlis ownership and control of firms is not usually in one hand.
The construction and real estate industries comprise three types of firms. The first
consists of state-owned firms. The public Perlis State Economic Development
Corporation (SEDC) owns a property developer, Perlis Holdings, and a contracting
firm. Each Malaysian state has such a corporation in order to promote economic
development, especially for Bumiputeras, by investment in promising activities.
Furthermore, another contractor is directly controlled by the office of the Perlis
Menteri Besar (MB, Chief Minister of the State Government). The CIMA cement
plant with 300 employees is predominantly owned by the UEM Group, which in turn
is part of the investment portfolio of Khazanah Nasional, the federal holding company.
Secondly, there are several Bumiputera-owned contracting firms. Thirdly, some
contractors, stone quarries and property developers are owned by ethnic Chinese
entrepreneurs. The larger firms among these frequently include one or more
Bumiputeras among their shareholders, so as to improve their chances for obtaining
public sector orders and licenses. This form of inter-ethnic cooperation has been
labelled Ali-Baba joint ventures (Bardhan, 2005: 195; White, 2004). Personal
capitalism is much less prevalent in the state. According to several interviewees the
overarching goal of the state-owned firms is to provide employment and create
multiplier effects for the regional economy rather than to increase shareholder welfare
(i.e., of the Perlis State or Federal Governments). A revealing example is the SEDC,
currently the second largest employer in Perlis but burdened by an unfavourable
financial position. According to the Malaysian Auditor-General (2006), its assets
exceeded liabilities by a factor of merely 1.2 between 2002 and 2004. This shows an
orientation in favour of other stakeholders than owners and managers, not unlike
Schmidt’s (2003) account of France’s state capitalism between 1950 and 1980.
Moreover, ownership and control are separate in the sense that high-ranking civil
servants and politicians are able to fire the managers of the state-owned firms.
The firm survey revealed that inter-firm relations are highly state-led and state-
mediated. We cite two examples as illustration: The SEDC has recently commenced
on the extensive Padang Besar Development project involving the construction of an
industrial zone, a transhipment centre, tourist facilities and residential areas. Another
state-owned company, Perlis Holdings, has been selected as the property developer
for the first phase of the project. The second example is a new strategy in the Ninth
Malaysia Plan, of transforming Perlis into a Halal Hub (EPU, 2006); another attempt
to create a comparative advantage by state intervention. The RM 10 million project
should make Perlis a processing and marketing centre of foods, pharmaceuticals and
beauty products that comply with Islamic prescriptions.
It is no surprise that private actors in the construction and real estate industries
primarily look at the public sector. Their aim is to win as many orders as possible. At the
same time, however, the public sector wishes to award orders to state-owned firms,
constraining the circulation of money and opportunities beyond the public sector. In this
regard it competes directly with the private sector. The overall results of this public
sector role are that public agencies stand at the centre of the regional economy, that
supply relations are relatively formal, contractual and impersonal, that the role of
business associations (even the construction association) remains limited, and that
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virtually no cooperation and coordination take place among competitors. Instead, firms
cultivate close relationships with government and associated agents such as the SEDC,
the Public Works Department, as well as civil servants and politicians of the Perlis state
government—if possible the MB himself. These institutional arrangements were also
found to be typical of other industries apart from construction and real estate. By a wide
margin, public authorities are mentioned as the most important clients of firms
interviewed (Andriesse, 2008). Ethnic Chinese construction firms have a special
position, since the public sector generally prefers to award tenders to Bumiputera
firms. Practising guanxi within the industry does not generate work, so entrepreneurs
try to team up with Bumiputera businesses, either in Ali-Baba joint ventures or as their
subcontractors. Thus, the traditional separation walls between ethnic groups are indeed
to some extent breached as a result of state-led and state-mediated inter-firm relations,
though not quite in the way intended. Our empirical findings from Perlis with respect
to the role of ethnicity match the observations for Malaysia in general made by Gomez
et al. (2003).
In addition to inter-firm relations, the government also plays an active role in shaping
access to finance, albeit with limited success. They obviously support the state-owned
firms financially, and operate a large number of financial programmes for Bumiputera
entrepreneurs that have not been very effective. The majority of Perlis’s Bumiputera
contracting firms still rely on their owners for start-up capital. Interviews with bank
managers generated similar results: only 18% of their transactions concerned corporate
banking (as opposed to 42% in Satun). Most problematic is the situation for small
ethnic-Chinese contractors. They can not rely on extensive guanxi networks and
simultaneously they face difficulties in obtaining capital from banks as they often lack
collateral. This confirms the observation that personal capitalism can impose
limitations on raising capital (Carney & Gedajlovic, 2001). In fact, small ethnic
Chinese contractors denied close relationships with Bumiputera firms and the public
sector operate in relative isolation, heavily constrained by the Malaysian state variety
of capitalism. These findings reveal that personal capitalism, particularly the way of
doing business among ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs, can vary substantially in response
to differences in national contexts.
In terms of distributive equity, a major advantage of the dominant public sector role is
the inclusion of employees into the development process. As an important employer, this
sector provides much more social security than enjoyed by the vulnerable employees of
Satun’s seafood cluster. In addition, the many technical colleges established recently as a
result of the knowledge strategy contribute to human capital formation in Malaysia,
even if the importance of this contribution cannot be assessed as yet. College graduates
generally do not find jobs in Perlis, but in other more prosperous states of Malaysia.
Human capital formation in the construction industry is much less important. The
subcontractors, who are responsible for a large share of the actual construction work,
try to cut costs as much as possible and often hire labourers on a temporary basis.
A good indication that the political dimension of institutional arrangements
should not be overlooked is found in the business strategies of large ethnic Chinese
contractors and property developers. They have found their way to lucrative business
via Ali-Baba joint ventures and the cultivation of close personal relationships with
the Bumiputera elite. One ethnic Chinese property developer, for example, is close to
the former Menteri Besar (MB) of Perlis, while his brother has managed to befriend
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the Raja (King) of Perlis. This mixing of personal links with business interests is
also common practice among Bumiputera firms. Several interviewees claimed that
open tendering for construction projects is hampered by the MB himself who
allegedly preferred to allocate projects to four associates. Influential “crony”
contractors have thus won many bids, including one for the new Perlis Court of
Justice. Similar outcomes in another regional context in Malaysia have been
convincingly documented in Shamsul (1986).9 In an effort to increase opportunities
for smaller contractors Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi has ordered the Public
Works Department to subdivide large projects among several contractors. This has
had an effect in Perlis. The tender process for the Padang Besar-Changloon highway
was cut into three parts. Three different contractors are building the highway: one
hails from outside Perlis and two are local Ali-Baba joint ventures, one of which is
associated with the MB. The five issues discussed lead to the following institutional
complementarities within the Perlis construction and real estate sector: on the one
hand, a leading role of the public sector in terms of ownership and inter-firm
relations is accompanied by a low level of interaction, cooperation and coordination
among private contractors and developers who focus their attention on gaining
access to projects financed by the Federal Government. Moreover, a relatively good
performance in terms of regional economic growth and other distributive effects is
combined with doubts about economic efficiency.
Discussion and conclusions
Our findings in Perlis and Satun clearly show the distinctive capitalist settings of the
two countries involved. This is no surprise, but our study also reveals that
institutional complementarities in Malaysia and Thailand have produced rather
different outcomes in terms of regional development in the relatively peripheral
regions straddling the international border. Table 4 summarises the main empirical
findings. Thailand’s variety of capitalism has forged a private-sector-dominated type
of regional economic development in Satun, based on the exploitation of its
comparative advantages by local entrepreneurs organised in national (and interna-
tional) value chains. This produces a relatively robust and competitive local private
sector. At the same time, guanxi institutions linking the dominant Sino-Thai business
community tend to exclude the Muslim majority of the population. Muslims are
virtually absent from private sector development in the province, while employment
in the private sector also offers limited perspectives due to the nature of personal
capitalism. Human capital formation outside the realm of family firms appears
limited. This is not much corrected by a public sector that largely refrains from
intervening in regional development, beyond the delivery of infrastructure and
supporting services. This aloofness, together with the gap between the Sino-Thai
business community and the Muslim majority, may shed some light on the causes of
9 Unfortunately, more recent sources are not available. The reason is probably that Malaysian authorities
try to reduce the number of politically sensitive studies. The fact that Shamsul’s publication enjoyed a
reprint in 2004 is telling for the limited number of other newer studies. In contrast, numerous political
studies have been published concerning Thailand, the Philippines and increasingly, Indonesia.
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conflict in neighbouring provinces in Southern Thailand, even if conditions there are
not quite the same as those observed in Satun.
In contrast, the economic make-up of Perlis can only be understood by considering
Malaysia’s state-led economic framework—or specifically, the way in which it is
manifest in a peripheral Malay (not just Malaysian!) region. One objective behind
massive investment in public (or public-private) projects is to forge new competitive
advantages in line with ambitions of turning the economically disadvantaged Malay
majority into an enterprising part of society. This policy has yielded some successes in
regional development. It has transformed Perlis from a rural into a more diverse, service-
based economy, with higher levels of employment, income and services. However, it
remains unclear whether the Malaysian model will ultimately succeed in transforming
its peripheries. It was evident in our discussion that state-led development has given rise
to considerable rent seeking, while doubts may be raised about the long-term economic
sustainability of much public sector investment. Human capital formation may occur,
but its impact on the local economy is unclear. Also, some crowding out of private sector
initiatives and a lesser degree of social capital formation could be observed, which is
likely to jeopardise regional development in the longer run.
What, then, are the more general implications of our findings in Satun and Perlis?
To what extent does our analysis allow conclusions about the role of institutional
frameworks in regional development, especially in non-core regions in Pacific Asia?
In the first place it has been shown that institutional complementarities do play an
important role in setting regions on a particular development trajectory. Our cases
demonstrate that effectively complementing institutions have a much more powerful
impact than arrangements that evolve in isolation. Thus, development policies
should aim at promoting positive complementarities in regional economic frame-
works. In this respect Hall and Soskice (2001: 45–51) argue that economic policies
are effective “if they are incentive compatible,” i.e., in line with the coordinating
capabilities embedded in the existing institutional environment. This may sound
obvious, but is not always understood when policy makers import “best practice”
models from other settings, without considering the match with the local context.
A good example of how differences in institutional environments may affect
economic behaviour is observed in the operation of the Chinese business
communities in the two study regions. The comparison of Perlis and Satun suggests
that entrepreneurial practices among ethnic Chinese are not as homogeneous across
Southeast Asia as put forward by Bjerke (2000), Perry (2003), Yeung (1999) and
Weidenbaum and Hughes (1996: 23–61). In our study, networking by Chinese
Table 4 Summary of empirical results.
Seafood industry in Satun Construction industry in Perlis
Ownership and control Coupled Separated
Inter-firm relations Informal networking, guanxi dynamics Formal, contractual, state-led
Access to finance Easy, banks and kinship ties Relatively difficult, owners/
shareholders
Human capital formation Limited Considerable
Political dimension Limited to Satun Municipality,
few links with “Bangkok”
Bumiputera policies, support
from Federal Government
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entrepreneurs is conditioned by a rational response to differences in the national
institutional context, namely one that compels them to team up with Bumiputera
partners in Malaysia, and one that fosters guanxi-style cooperation within the
community in Thailand.
Beyond institutional complementarities, our findings raise two additional issues
not adequately covered in much of the literature on capitalist varieties. One is the
distributive dimension of economic systems, and the other issue is that of their
sustainability in the longer term.
Each national variety of capitalism not only defines conditions for economic
activity, but also determines how benefits are to be divided among different
stakeholders. As mentioned, Jayasuriya (2004) conceptualises Asian economies as
consisting of a “mercantilist” growth coalition around the export sector, combined
with a transfer mechanism (“side payments”) for the benefit of key interest groups
outside of the leading economic sector. The first component (growth coalition)
obviously concentrates on creating optimal conditions for economic performance
while side payments take care of the distribution of wealth. Although the importance
of distribution issues is fairly widely accepted, much of the literature on capitalist
varieties favours the first question—maximise growth—above the distribution issue.
Nevertheless, the comparison of regions in Malaysia and Thailand highlights the key
role of distribution mechanisms in the definition of their respective national
economic systems. Malaysia emerges as a state-led economic system not because
of considerations of economic strategy, but due to the political necessity of
accommodating the aspirations of the Malay majority of its population. Although
Malaysian policies often profess to aim at boosting the role of ethnic Malays in the
national economy, they are rather more successful in redressing wealth distribution
than in changing performance. Thus, a relatively peripheral state such as Perlis
benefits from transfer payments by virtue of the ethnic composition of its population
(mostly Malays), and not so much as compensation for its peripheral position in the
national space economy. Policies are also more effective in improving income and
consumption levels than in creating competitive advantages in Perlis, as we have
seen. In Thailand, side payments are less conspicuous although they have been used
to cater to the constituents of coalition governments in the past, and in order to
mobilise the provincial support base of the Thaksin governments. In comparison to
Malaysia, Thailand looks relatively disinterested in redressing economic imbalances
between social groups and regions; in this respect it matches Tipton’s (2007)
characterisation of Southeast Asian states as relatively weak in social engineering.
But then, Thailand’s political constellation is less affected by such wealth gaps.
Southern Muslims may see little of the benefits of growth, but their disaffection is
seen as a local matter rather than as a threat to national stability—and, thus, does not
trigger a response in the design of economic institutions. This perpetuates the
problem. Creating and maintaining balances—between social and ethnic groups, and
between the constituent regions of a country is vital for successful economic and
social models, from an efficiency as well as an ethical point of view. In fact, both the
Malaysian and Thai cases show few signs of overcoming imbalances. This brings us
to the last issue, that of institutional sustainability.
Institutional complementarities may enhance economic performance and policy
effectiveness; they may also have the effect of locking regional development into a
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trajectory that is unsustainable in the longer term. Both of our cases show some
disturbing features in this respect. The Malaysian case depends on transfers from the
national economy that can be sustained in a context of relatively high economic
growth and the ability of the government to use oil and gas revenues for side
payments, rather than having to rely on them for its own operations. Such conditions
are not likely to last in the long run. Thus, the challenge is for such regions to
develop local income sources before the flow of funds from Putrajaya runs out. As
we have seen, however, the economic rationale for much of this investment is in
doubt. The emergence of new competitive strengths cannot be taken for granted. The
Malaysian system induces stakeholders to try to gain access to the transfer flows, not
to optimise their impact. In the Thai case, unsustainable environmental pressure may
well undermine the current economic model. Unfettered private development of
fisheries, aquaculture, and tourism may well exhaust the natural resource base before
diversification into other industries has sufficiently progressed. Thailand’s record in
taking timely remedial action is hardly encouraging: witness, for instance, the
abandoned aquaculture ponds on the Gulf of Thailand coast, poisoned by speculative
short-term exploitation. Moreover, the socio-economic cleavages observed raise
worries about the social sustainability of the development trajectory. The ethnic
conflict in the neighbouring provinces of Southern Thailand is a crude reminder of
this problem. The disturbing point in both cases is not the lack of balance per se:
each economic system probably will prove unsustainable when current trends are
projected into the future. The problem is a lack of corrective mechanisms or
countervailing forces—precisely because of institutional complementarities. Thus, in
our view, the sustainability of economic systems, or their ability to adapt, deserves
more attention in the study of capitalist varieties. In doing this, the way in which
distributive questions are accommodated or ignored is likely to be a major factor.
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